On analysts' earnings forecast for failing firms by Moses, O. Douglas
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1990
On analysts' earnings forecast for failing firms
Moses, O. Douglas
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring 1990
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44173
Journal OfBusincss Finance Cj. Accounting, 17(1) Spring 1990, 0306 686X 12.50 
O N  ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS 
FOR FAILING FIRMS 
0. DOUGLAS MOSES* 
Much research has been conducted on the properties of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (AEF) and their information content in the context of the securities 
market. Broad conclusions are that AEF reflect a wide range of information, 
are relatively accurate and are associated with market returns and risk. Little 
research has been conducted on how the properties of AEF differ between 
different classes of firms and on whether AEF are useful in predicting events 
outside of the securities market. The general issues of interest in the study are 
how well AEF reflect different conditions faced by firms and how well measures 
based on AEF perform as indicators of future events. These issues are addressed 
by focusing on a particular class of firms, those that are failing. The specific 
objective is to examine differences in AEF between failing and healthy firms, 
and investigate whether measures developed from AEF are useful indicators 
of impending bankruptcy. 
PRIOR RESEARCH ON AEF 
Considerable prior research has examined the properties of AEF, their accuracy, 
and their relationship to the securities market. (For reviews, see Givoly and 
Lakonishok, 1984; and Brown, et al., 1985). Research on the ability of analysts 
to predict future earnings for firms indicates that AEF are generally superior 
to time series models based on past reported earnings (Barefield and Comiskey, . 
1975; Brown and Rozeff, 1979; and Collins and Hopwood, 1980) and show 
that AEF reflect information not captured by historical earnings trends (Fried 
and Givoly, 1982). Analysts revise their forecasts in a timely manner and 
apparently are able to separate a permanent from a temporary component in 
reported earnings numbers (Critchfield, et al., 1978). Furthermore, the 
superiority of AEF over time series models is more pronounced in years where 
there is a turning point in the earnings trend (Barefield and Comiskey, 1975). 
These findings suggest that AEF are a comprehensive piece of information which 
capture information that is external to firms’ accounting systems. 
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Research on the relationship between AEF and the securities market has 
documented an association between AEF and revisions in AEF with stock prices 
and has provided evidence that favorable trading strategies based on AEF can 
be developed (Niederhoffer and Regan, 1972; Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979 
and 1980; and Elton, et al., 1984). Studies suggest that AEF are a better 
surrogate for the market expectation of earnings than are naive predictions 
based on historical earnings (Malkiel, 1970; Malkiel and Cragg, 1970; and 
Fried and Givoly, 1982). In short, AEF are useful indicators of expected 
performance in the securities market. 
Of particular interest in the current context is research on measures of risk 
derived from AEF. The error in earnings forecasts has been shown analytically 
to be an appropriate indicator of uncertainty (Cukierman and Givoly, 1982), 
while the dispersion of forecasts across analysts and the unpredictability of earn- 
ings has been shown empirically to be associated with traditional risk measures 
such as beta and the standard deviation of returns (Givoly and Lakonishok, 
1983). The dispersion of AEF has also been shown to be superior to measures 
of beta, economy risk, information risk, and interest rate risk in explaining 
expected return (Malkiel, 198 1). Consequently, dispersion and unpredictability 
in AEF may serve as useful indicators of risk. 
In short, analysts’ earnings forecasts are forward looking, reflective of a broad 
information set, and provided and revised in a timely manner. AEF can be 
expected to reflect macroeconomic events, industry expectations and firm- 
specific non-accounting information. AEF are associated with future returns 
and capture aspects of risk. Earnings is considered the single most important 
expectational data item by investors (Chang and Most, 1980) so there is con- 
siderable attention and importance attached to AEF. For these reasons, AEF 
may differ systematically across firms depending on the conditions faced by 
the firms and AEF may reflect information relevant to predicting future events 
(aside from their well-documented relevance in stock valuation). More 
specifically, AEF may reflect conditions that lead to failure and may be poten- 
tially useful in indicating future bankruptcy, Subsequent sections address three 
distinct but related issues: 
(1) The nature of AEF for failing firms. Do forecasts appear to reflect con- 
(2) The quality of AEF for failing firms. How well do forecasts estimatr 
( 3 )  The information content of AEF. Can AEF measures be used to predict 
ditions associated with failure? 
actual earnings for failing firms? 
future failure? 
SAMPLE AND NOTATION 
Firms declaring bankruptcy from 1977 through 1985 were identified from the 
F €3 S Index .f Corporate Changes and the Wall Street Journal Index. A test period 
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of four years prior to bankruptcy was defined and AEF data were collected 
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) for sample firms during 
the test period. IBES contains summary statistics related to annual earnings 
per-share forecasts from multiple forecasters who report their predictions to 
the IBES service. Each month IBES provides information on the mean forecast, 
median forecast, high forecast, low forecast, standard deviation of forecasts, 
actual reported earnings in prior years, and a number of other forecast related 
data. IBES contained data in years prior to failure for 68 firms that declared 
bankruptcy during the test period.’ 
Using rankings provided in the annual Wards Directory of Leading US Corpora- 
tions, each brankrupt firm was matched with a non-bankrupt firm from the 
same industry and of approximately the same size2 resulting in a total sample 
of 136 firms.3 
The notation used in the paper refers to fiscal years. Two time related items 
are important: the year in which bankruptcy is declared for a bankrupt firm 
and the month relative to fiscal year-end within any year. The notation used 
treats bankruptcy as time ‘zero’ and counts backward in time such that both 
years and months increase as the time before bankruptcy or year-end increases. 
Year zero is the year in which bankruptcy was declared for a failing firm (and 
the corresponding fiscal year for the corresponding healthy firm in a matched 
pair). Year one is the fiscal year immediately prior to the year in which 
bankruptcy was declared. Within any given fiscal year, month zero is the last 
month in the year (e.g. December for a firm with December 31 year-end). 
Month three is three months prior to year-end (e.g. September), and so on. 
AEF for four years prior to bankruptcy at three month intervals corresponding 
to the end of the quarters were examined. 
MEASURES FROM ANALYSTS’ FORECASTS 
Four properties of AEF were investigated: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
The average forecasted earnings per share provided by analysts (EPS). 
The dispersion or disagreement in forecasts across multiple analyst 
forecasters (DISP). 
The accuracy or error in forecasts when compared to actual reported 
earnings (ERROR). 
The bias in forecasts - whether they under or over predict actual earnings 
(BIAS). 
Measures4 to reflect the four properties were calculated as follows: 
1. EPS,,n = Y,, 
2. DISP,, = Standard deviation of forecasts for year t at month m across 
multiple forecasters. 
ERROR, = I F,, - Y,l 3.  
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4. BIAS,, = $,- Y, 
MOSES 
where tm = Mean Forecasted earnings per share for year t provided at 
month m, 
= Actual reported earnings per share for year t, 
= 1, 2, 3 or 4 (years prior to bankruptcy), 




These properties may change over time. To reflect how the properties change 
across years (year-to-year changes), the difference between measures taken at 
month 0 in successive years was determir~ed.~ For example, to reflect the year- 
to-year change in forecasted EPS: 
EPSCHANGE, = EPS,,o-EPS,-l,o 
Analogous measures reflecting year-to-year changes in forecast error (ERROR- 
CHANGE), forecast dispersion (DISPCHANGE) and forecast bias 
(BIASCHANGE) were developed. 
To reflect how the properties change within a given forecast year (within 
year trends), the difference between measures taken at mid-year (month 6 )  and 
year-end (month 0) was computed.6 For example, to reflect the trend in EPS: 
EPSTREND, = EPS,,,-EPS,,b 
An analogous measure reflecting the within year trend in forecast dispersion 
(DISPTREND) was developed.’ 
ON THE NATURE OF FORECASTS FOR FAILING FIRMS 
Broadly speaking, future performance for firms can be described by two con- 
structs: risk and expected return. As indicated above, AEF measures have been 
shown to be associated with both risk and return. If failing and healthy firms 
differ in their risk and return characteristics, one would expect systematic dif- 
ferences in their AEF properties. Two measures, EPS and DISP, reflect aspects 
of expected performance and risk, respectively. 
EPS: Although low earnings does not imply bankruptcy and high earnings 
does not insure health, one would expect some relationship between the level 
of earnings and the probability of future failure. While reported earnings may 
contain information relevant to distinguishing between groups, forecasted earn- 
ings is future looking and consequently has the potential to reflect aspects of 
firm health that have not yet been reflected in reported earnings. If conditions 
that lead to failure are reflected in AEF one might expect failing firms to have 
(a) lower forecasted earnings, and (b) declining forecasted earnings as failure 
approaches. 
Table 1 shows group means for the EPS variables and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests of significance for group differences (equivalent to 
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Table 1 
Group Differences in Forecasted EPS Measures 
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Group Means Wikoxon 
Variable Year Month Fatling Healthy Z a 
EPS 1 0 -0.86 1.57 -6.17 0.000 
3 -0.27 1.77 -6.15 0.000 
6 0.44 1.95 -4.91 0.000 
9 0.88 2.02 -4.23 0.000 
2 0 -0.81 1:69 -4.94 0.000 
3 0.07 1.87 -4.25 0.000 
6 0.58 2.10 -3.36 0.001 
9 1.24 2.14 -2.99 0.003 
3 0 0.22 1.91 -3.14 0.002 
3 0.95 1.97 -1.97 0.049 
6 1.24 2.07 -1.62 0.105 
9 1.78 2.20 -1.06 0.291 
4 0 1.11 1.96 -1.78 0.075 
3 1.59 1.97 -0.89 0.373 
6 2.09 1.93 -0.09 0.924 
9 2.33 1.82 0.21 0.835 
EPSTREND 1 -1.34 -0.29 -3.75 0.000 
2 - 1.51 -0.27 -3.66 0.000 
3 -1.05 -0.08 -2.26 0.024 




-0.08 -0.03 -2.54 0.011 
-1.46 -0.09 -3.07 0.002 
- 1.01 0.09 -1.96 0.049 
Mann-Whitney UTests). Both expectations appear to hold. Failing firms have 
lower forecasted EPS up to about 33years prior to failure and significantly 
lower EPS (a 5 0.05) for about 2$ years. Group differences in how EPS 
changes over time are also apparent. There are consistent negative value for 
EPSTREND and EPSCHANGE for failing firms, indicating declining forecasts 
both within individual years and from year to year. Although values for 
EPSTREND and EPSCHANGE also tend to be negative for the healthy firms, 
the Wilcoxon tests indicate that the declines are significantly greater for the 
failing group. 
DZSP Dispersion or disagreement across multiple forecasters has been shown 
to reflect uncertainty or risk. Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) see AEF disper- 
sion measures as ‘unique’ because unlike most traditional measures of risk, 
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they are ‘ex ante’ measures. Two aspects of risk or uncertainty may be rele- 
vant for failing firms. One, financial risk or uncertainty, refers to the inability 
of a firm to pay its debts as they become due (see for example, Block and Hirt, 
1987). The second, which might be termed information risk or uncertainty, 
refers to the tendency for misleading or confusing information to appear con- 
cerning firms in distress. If failing firms become financially more risky as failure 
approaches andlor there is increased uncertainty concerning the quality of 
information for firms in distress, and this uncertainty is reflected in AEF, one 
would expect failing firms to have (a) greater dispersion in forecasts and (b) 
increasing dispersion as failure approaches. 
Table 2 shows group means for dispersion measures. Except for month 9 
of year 3 ,  forecast dispersion is consistently greater for the failing group. These 
group differences are most pronounced at the end of each forecast year and 
Table 2 
Group Differences in Forecast Dispersion Measures 
Group Means Wilcoxon 
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become significant as early as three years prior to failure. Thus forecast disper- 
sion may capture uncertainty associated with impending failure. 
Findings for changes in dispersion over time are mixed. Except for year 4, 
DISPTREND and DISPCHANGE are positive for the failing firms, indicating 
consistently increasing dispersion, both within and across years, in the three 
years prior to failure. This finding would be expected if uncertainty increases 
as failure approaches. However, signs for DISPTREND for the healthy group 
are also positive and group differences for both DISPTREND and 
DISPCHANGE are not significant. 
O N  THE QUALITY OF FORECASTS FOR FAILING FIRMS 
In a review of research on AEF, Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) discuss the 
rationality (Muth, 1961) of analysts forecasts and evaluate AEF in terms of 
their rationality. They state that if AEF are rational they should be ‘unbiased’ 
and ‘most accurate’. Unbiased implies no systematic error; most accurate 
implies, among other things, superiority over time series forecast models using 
reported earnings. They conclude that, in general, evidence supports rationality 
for AEF; AEF tend to be more accurate than time series forecast models (and 
incorporate information on past reported earnings and past forecast errors), 
and are not significantly biased. The issue of interest here is whether forecasts 
for failing and healthy firms differ with respect to accuracy and bias. 
ERROR. Two tests concerning the accuracy of analysts forecasts were con- 
ducted. The first addresses whether AEF, for failing firms in particular, are 
‘most accurate’; the second compares the accuracy of AEF for failing firms 
as compared to healthy firms. 
First, to test if AEF are ‘most accurate’, forecast errors using analysts’ 
forecasts were compared to forecast errors using a naive (no change) forecast. 
Recall that AEF error was previously measured as 
Similarly, errors using a naive model were constructed as 
Naive Error, = I Y,- - Y,l. 
A simple difference between the two types of error provides a measure’ 
indicating which prediction source is superior to the other: 
Error Difference,,,, = I Y f p 1  - Yll - I f i m -  Y,l. 
Positive (negative) values indicate analyst superiority (inferiority) to the naive 
forecast. 
Group means and t tests of significant difference from zero for failing and 
healthy firms are shown in Table 3. Error differences for both groups are positive 
throughout the three years prior to failure, so on average AEF are superior 
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Table 3 
Forecast Error Differences: Analysts’ Forecast vs Naive Model 
Failing Healthy 
Year Month Mean t a Mean t a 
1 P* 0.61 0.86 0.400 0.54 4.30 0.000 
0 0.35 0.58 0.565 0.51 3.96 0.000 
3 0.46 0.80 0.435 0.37 3.45 0.001 
6 1.27 1.53 0.145 0.22 1.97 0.054 
2 P 1.14 2.98 0.006 0.34 4.09 0.000 
0 0.96 2.74 0.010 0.29 3.51 0.001 
3 0.44 2.11 0.043 0.15 1.62 0.111 
6 0.05 0.27 0.786 0.10 1.29 0.203 
3 P 1.24 1.77 0.086 0.36 2.67 0.010 
0 1.30 1.75 0.090 0.36 2.57 0.013 
3 0.63 1.42 0.165 0.29 2.20 0.032 
6 0.33 0.73 0.472 0.14 1.22 0.228 
‘P = Month immediately prior to announcement of actual reported earnings. 
to the naive forecast. But the degree of superiority differs between the two 
groups. In the latter months of each year, and after year-end at the month 
immediately prior to announcement of actual reported earnings (month ‘P’ 
in the table), AEF for the healthy group are significantly more accurate than 
naive forecasts. 
Analyst superiority over naive forecasts is considerably less impressive for 
the failing firms. T values are lower for the failing group and generally 
insignificant except in the latter months of year 2.  The contrast between the 
two groups is most pronounced in the year immediately prior to failure; analysts 
are unable to out-predict the naive model for failing firms, even in the month 
immediately before announcement of earnings, at any reasonable level of 
significance. 
The second test asks whether there are systematic differences in the magnitude 
of forecast errors between failing and healthy firms. As indicated earlier forecast 
errors have been shown to reflect uncertainty and risk. If firms become more 
risky as failure approaches and this uncertainty is reflected in AEF, one would 
expect failing firms to have (a) larger forecast errors, and (b) increasing errors 
as failure approaches. 
Table 4 shows group means for ERROR and ERRORCHANGE measures 
and Wilcoxon tests for significant differences between the groups. ERROR 
values are consistently larger for failing firms and significantly so as early as 
year 4. This is consistent with larger forecast errors reflecting the greater risk 
of the failing firms. ERRORCHANGE values indicate a particularly large 
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Table 4 
Group Differences in Forecast Error Measures 
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Variable 
Group Means Wilcoxon 
Year Month Failin8 Healthy Z a 



















4.17 0.40 5.97 
5.16 0.55 5.46 
6.63 0.72 5.95 
6.66 0.89 6.01 
1.40 0.43 3.27 
2.07 0.58 3.86 
2.10 0.63 3.51 
2.97 0.75 3.00 
0.86 0.34 3.76 
1.52 0.44 3.39 
1 .89 0.64 2.54 
2.59 0.77 2.18 
0.62 0.26 2.59 
0.91 0.39 1.72 
1.70 0.56 2.42 
2.21 0.77 1.50 
3.65 0.05 2.92 
0.07 0.14 1.23 
0.17 0.10 0.67 
0.000 


















increase in forecast errors for the failing group from year 2 to year 1. This 
is consistent with increasing uncertainty as bankruptcy approaches being 
reflected in increasing forecast errors. 
BIAS. Studies by Critchfield et al. (1978), Givoly (1985), and Malkiel and 
Cragg (1980) have failed to reject the hypothesis that AEF are unbiased. 
However there is reason to expect differences in bias between failing and healthy 
firms. There is some evidence that firms tend to withhold ‘bad’ news in hope 
or anticipation of improvement (Penman, 1980). Hence, the pattern of infor- 
mation released to analysts may differ for failing firms. If failing firms experience 
worse performance and news of that experience is withheld (until disclosed in 
the reported earnings number), over-optimistic forecasts should result. Con- 
sequently, failing firms should have (a) more positive values for BIAS. If the 
‘bad’ news is more pronounced the closer to actual failure, failing firms could 
have (b) increasing bias from year-to-year. 
Table 5 displays group means for BIAS and tests of significant difference 
from zero. While there is occasional evidence of a significant positive bias for 
healthy firms in the early months of some years, BIAS values are small and 
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Table 5 
Significance of Forecast Bias, by Groups 
Failing Finns Healthy Finns 

























































































































'P = Month immediately prior to announcement of actual reported earnings number. 
insignificantly different from zero in the latter months and in the month just 
prior to announcement in all years. Analysts have available sufficient 
information on healthy firms to produce unbiased forecasts by year-end. 
BIAS values for the failing group are consistently larger for three years prior 
to failure and, except for month P in year 2 ,  are significantly positive throughout 
that three year period. Thus forecasts for failing firms are significantly 
optimistic. Even by year-end, analysts do not have available sufficient 
information to produce unbiased forecasts. 
While BIAS values for the failing group are larger than for the healthy group, 
both are positive. Are BIAS values significantly greater for failing firms? Table 
6 provides Wilcoxon tests for group differences. Results indicate significantly 
greater bias up through three years prior to failure. While not statistically dif- 
ferent from the healthy group, the failing group also has a large BIASCHANGE 
measure in year 1, suggestive of an increase in bias from year 2 to year 1 .  
In short, results show significantly over-optimistic forecasts for failing firms 
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Table 6 
Group Differences in Forecast Bias Measures 
Group Means Wilcoxon 
Variable Year Month Failing Healthy z (Y 




























































4 0 -0.14 0.02 -0.34 0.734 
3 0.31 -0.00 0.56 0.579 
6 1.07 -0.07 0.95 0.342 
9 1.32 -0.18 1.22 0.224 
BIASCHANGE 1 3.99 -0.07 1.89 0.058 
3 0.83 0.17 1.83 0.067 
2 -0.17 0.07 -0.44 0.661 
for three years and suggest some increase in over-estimation in the year just 
prior to failure. 
A comment on the implications of this apparent bias is perhaps necessary. 
Does the presence of a bias imply irrational forecasts? Both Critchfield et al. 
(1978) and Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) indicate that rational forecasts should 
be unbiased. Yet there are two possible explanations for the observed bias for 
the failing group. First, forecasters could have failed to properly incorporate 
information available to them at the time of the forecast. Second, analysts could 
have properly incorporated available information but information indicating 
that forecasts were optimistic was not available at the time of the forecast (i.e. 
‘bad’ news was withheld). 
To investigate the first possibility, two tests, modeled after those conducted 
by Givoly (1985), were conducted for the years prior to failure. Partial correla- 
tions between x and x-, (given EPS,) were computed. This is a test of 
whether past earnings contain information related to future earnings that is 
not incorporated into forecasts. The partial correlations were generally insignifi- 
cant. This finding is consistent with analyst use of the information contained 
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in historical earnings. Next, tests of serial correlation between forecast errors 
were conducted. Correlations were insignificant. This finding is consistent with 
analyst incorporation of the information contained in past forecast errors. In 
short there was no evidence of failure to use information available in historical 
earnings and past forecast errors. 
T o  investigate the second possibility, correlations between the change in 
reported earnings from year to year ( y -  Yt-l) and BIAS, were computed. 
Correlations were consistently high, significant and negative (ranging from 
-0.93 to -0.61 over years 1-3). This indicates that as the decline in earn- 
ings gets larger, forecasts become more over-optimistic. This finding is consis- 
tent with firms withholding bad news. It is inconsistent with arguments offered 
by some (e.g. Ajinkya and Gift, 1984) that firms have incentives to disclose 
information, both good and bad, to ‘correct’ erroneous analyst forecasts. In 
short, the additional tests are more supportive of the view that the observed 
bias was due to lack of information, not failure to use available information. 
ON THE PREDICTIVE CONTENT OF AEF MEASURES 
Collectively the findings indicate that measures of the four forecast properties 
investigated differ systematically between healthy and failing firms in years 
prior to failure. 
Can these systematic differences be used to predict failure? The most com- 
mon source of information for assessing financial health and predicting failure 
is financial ratios taken from accounting reports (see Zavgren, 1983, for a 
review). There are, however, several weaknesses in using accounting data. 
Accounting data are produced only periodically, are historical rather than 
prospective, and reflect events that are primarily endogenous to the firm. 
Accounting measures are sensitive to the choice of accounting procedures, 
subject to ‘window dressing’, and inevitably vary in magnitude across firms 
and industries as a function of the nature of operations and technology. Perhaps 
alternative failure indicators, to supplement the use of accounting ratios, can 
be developed from AEF measures. 
There were ten different kinds of measures (reflecting four properties of AEF 
and how those properties change over time) that were previously calculated. 
To investigate predictive ability, one measure of each kind was selected. The 
above tests indicate that the differences between failing and healthy firms 
become more pronounced as failure approaches, so the measures were selected 
to emphasize the period shortly before bankruptcy. EPS,,,; DISP,,,; 
ERROR,,,; and BIASl,o are measures of the four primary properties at year- 
end in year 1. ERRORCHANGE, and BIASCHANGE, capture the 
relatively large increases in forecast error and bias that occurred for failing 
firms from year 2 to year 1. EPSCHANGE, and EPSTREND, together cap- 
ture the change in EPS over the 13 years prior to the bankruptcy year. 
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DISPCHANGE, and DISPTRENDl together capture the change in DISP 
over the same layear  period. In short, these ten measures, reflect the four 
AEF properties and their changes over time shortly before bankruptcy. 
To test predictive ability, the ten measures were combined in a ‘failure index’. 
By far the most popular approach for combining variables into a bankruptcy 
classiciation or prediction model has been multivariate discriminant analysis. 
(See Zavgren, 1983, for a review). However, the use of discriminant analysis 
has been criticized (Moyer, 1977; and Eisenbeis, 1977). Moses and Liao (1986 
and 1987) explain a procedure for combining multiple variables into a failure 
index that in their study out-performed discriminant models in predicting 
failure. A procedure analogous to Moses and Liao was used to create the index 
reported here.g 
The procedure for creating the index included two basic steps: First, values 
for the ten individual variables were separately analyzed to provide indepen- 
dent univariate classifications of the sample firms into healthy or failing 
categories (this step is analogous to Beaver, 1966); second, the ten indepen- 
dent classifications were aggregated into an index and a final classification was 
based on the index. In more detail: 
Firms were rank ordered independently on each of the ten individual 
variables. The rank ordered values for a given variable were then visually 
observed and a threshold value for each variable was selected to divide sample 
observations into failing and healthy firms. Threshold values were selected that 
minimized the percentage of firms misclassified. For example, EPS values for 
the sample firms ranged from - 9.50 to 6.46, with failing firms clustered toward 
the lower values. Selecting a threshold of 0.11 and classifying firms below 
(above) the threshold as failing (healthy) minimized misclassifications (and 
resulted in a classification error rate of 22 per cent for the sample.)” 
Next, for each of the ten variables, a firm was assigned a score of 1 if 
it fell on the ‘bankruptcy’ side of the threshold for the particular variable, and 
0 otherwise. Then the ten scores were added for each firm into a total score 
(the index). This approach rests on the simple idea that a consensus prediction 
from multiple sources (i.e. the univariate signals) is typically more accurate 
than the individual sources (Beaver, 1981). If more of the variable values for 
a given firm fell on the bankruptcy side of the thresholds, a higher total index 
score resulted for the firm; index scores from zero to ten were possible. If the 
index is a useful classification tool, failing (healthy) firms should cluster toward 
higher (lower) index scores. Lastly, firms were rank ordered on their index 
scores and a threshold value for the index that minimized errors in classifica- 
tion was determined by viewing the ranking of index scores. (This process is 
analogous to that performed on the values for individual variables in step 1 
above.) This index threshold provided the dividing line for classifying firms 
as failing or healthy.” 
The overall classification error rate using this index approach was 4 per cent. 
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* Type 1 error is misclassifying a failing firm as healthy. 
* *  Type 2 error is misclassifying a healthy firm as failing. 
in discriminating between two groups since the classification procedure (index) 
is applied to the same sample on which it is developed. Validation is required. 
Ideally, validity should be assessed on a sample unrelated to that used to develop 
the classification rule, a hold out sample. Operationally this was achieved by 
randomly dividing the sample into two subsamples, developing an index 
independently from each subsample, and using the index from each subsample 
to classify the firms in the other subsample. Classification errors in each of 
the two subsamples were than averaged to get error rates for the full sample. 
There was no decline in predictive ability" from the validation procedure; 
overall error rate" remained at 4 per cent. One can compare this with various 
models using traditional accounting ratios as predictors that have appeared 
in the published literature. Zavgren (1983) reviewed nine published models 
and provided details, when available, on classification and validated error rates 
in the year immediately prior to failure. A comparative summary is provided 
in Table 7. The AEF failure index appears competitive with these models; in 
fact, its overall error rate of 4 per cent on the validation test is less than for 
any of the other models reported.'* 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Collectively the findings indicate three things. 
( 1) Analysts' forecasts apparently do reflect conditions that are associated 
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with failure. Indicators of predicted performance (EPS) are lower and indicators 
of risk (DISP) are higher for failing firms, and both indicators change in the 
expected manner as failure approaches. These findings are not surprising but 
do confirm, for a particular class of firms, the general conclusion from prior 
research that analysts’ forecasts are a useful, comprehensive data item updated 
over time to reflect changing conditions. 
Analysts’ forecasts are of poorer quality for firms approaching failure. 
Forecast errors were larger and increased for failing firms as bankruptcy 
approached; forecasts were over2optimistic and bias increased for failing firms 
as bankruptcy approached. The larger forecast errors are not surprising since 
forecast errors have been shown to be related to uncertainty. The uncertainty 
is apparently great enough that forecasts for failing firms are not consistently 
significantly better than a naive (no change) forecast. The poor accuracy is 
due to significant over-estimation. This bias is probably caused not by failure 
of analysts to properly incorporate available information but rather by inability 
of analysts to obtain information that fully reflects the condition of firms 
approaching failure. Failing firms may withhold bad news. 
Measures developed from analysts’ forecasts do have information con- 
tent for predicting future states of firms, specifically bankruptcy. While most 
past research has, not unreasonably, explored the usefulness of analysts’ 
forecasts in the context of the securities market, the findings here suggest their 
potential value in other areas of prediction. 
There are several directions for future research. Those interested in the pro- 
perties of forecasts may wish to further explore the issue of bias. Both Givoly 
(1985) and Critchfield et al. (1978) detected no substantial forecast bias in their 
studies. Although their samples were more representative of the population 
of all firms, they were not fully representative in that firms with poor (i.e. 
negative) earnings were deleted. The findings here indicate that the properties 
of forecasts may differ for such groups and may be a function of information 
disclosure practices of firms. Those interested in the process by which infor- 
mation is released by firms and the ability of analysts to obtain information 
may find firms in poor health an informative sample to investigate. 
Those interested in bankruptcy prediction may wish to further investigate 
the use of AEF measures. While additional kinds of measures and models 
involving AEF could be explored, the most interesting direction may be to 
address the relative or incremental predictive ability of AEF measures when 
compared to traditional accounting ratios. The fact that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts do reflect failure relevant information and, being forward looking, 
have the potential to reflect evolving events prior to the publication of finan- 
cial statements, indicates that signals provided by analysts’ earnings forecasts 
might be used as an early warning of failure in conjunction with traditional 
reliance on financial accounting ratios. 
More generally, those interested in prediction of various future events may 
find analysts’ forecasts a potential source of predictive indicators. The findings 




firm differences in expected performance, risk and information disclosure. The 
fact that a model using AEF measures to predict failure was competitive with 
models using accounting ratios suggests that AEF measures have useful infor- 
mation content in areas outside of their traditional role in stock valuation. 
NOTES 
1 The distribution ofthe 68 bankrupt firms across calender years was as follows: 1985 (14), 1984 
(19), 1983 (9), 1982 (13), 1981 (7), 1980 (3), 1979 (2), 1977 (1). 
2 Matching on industry is desirable to control for industry characteristics and conditions. Forecast 
uncertainty may be related to industry. Furthermore, information events may have industry- 
wide implications leading to industry-wide revisions in earnings forecasts. 
Matching on size is desirable because size is associated with risk, probability of bankruptcy, 
analyst attention, and most likely, the number of sources from which consensus forecasts and 
summary statistics on the IBES tape are developed. Using total assets (sales) as a measure of 
size, 58% (50%) of bankrupt firms were larger than their non-bankrupt matched firm. Tests 
revealed no significant difference in mean size between bankrupt and non-bankrupt groups. 
Matching on fiscal year-end would perhaps be desirable but was not possible without a great 
reduction in sample size. Data for each firm in a given matched pair were however taken from 
the same fiscal year. Within a given year there is substantial evidence that the properties of 
analysts’ forecasts change as the year-end approaches. For example, forecasts tend to become 
more accurate as the end of a reporting year approaches. However, data in the study was analyzed 
in terms of fiscal years rather than calender years, which minimizes any problems associated 
with firms having different fiscal year-ends. 
3 The 68 pairs, 136 firms, represent the maximum sample available for the analysis conducted. 
However, data for each firm was not available on IBES for each month and year of the test 
period, so some tests were conducted on sample sizes less than 136. 
4 Each of these measures uses the mean forecasted EPS as the average forecast across forecasters. 
Tests using the median were also conducted. 
Each of these measures also uses undeflated EPS values. It may be argued that adjustment 
for magnitude differences in EPS may be desirable. Tests deflating by stock price and by prior 
years reported earnings were conducted. 
In addition to the standard deviation, alternative measures of the dispersion of forecasts, 
such as the variance and range as well as versions of these measures deflated by price and EPS, 
were also investigated. Tests using all of the above alternatives provided findings similar to 
those reported here for the simpler undeflated measures. 
5 Year-to-year changes can be calculated using forecasts from any month within a given year. 
Because forecasts are not available for some firms in the early part of a given year, year end 
forecasts were used to maximize sample size. 
6 A six month period was in general adequate to capture the within year trends. The six months 
at the end of a forecast year was used to allow sufficient time for release of the previous year’s 
reported earnings. 
7 Analogous within year trend measures for BIAS and ERROR can be calculated but they are 
a function of EPSTREND and thus are redundant. 
8 This is simply the undeflated difference in forecast error. Other error difference measures were 
computed by deflating by (a) reported earnings, (b) forecast error from the naive model, (c) 
stock price, and by computing (d) a log relative measure (In (analyst forecast errorhaive forecast 
error)). Each alternative provided the same findings. Additional tests were also conducted using 
a random walk with a drift as a naive model. Findings did not change. 
9 Discriminant models were constructed but were inferior to the index approach. 
10 Univariate classification error rates ranged from 13 per cent to 29 per cent across the 10 variables. 
One can test for statistical significance by comparing the error rates from this univariate threshold 
approach with error rates resulting from a random assignment of firms to categories. (See f -  
test described by Altman, 1983, p. 113). Classification results for all 10 variables were statistically 
superior to random assignment at p < 0.10. 
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11 Index scores ranged from 0 to 8. All firms with index scores of 0 or 1 were healthy; all with 
index scores of 4 or more ultimately failed. Firms with index scores of 2 or 3 were a mixture 
of failing and healthy, a gray area. The optimal threshold was between 2 and 3. 
12 Most bankruptcy researchers assess the predictive ability of their models relative to results 
achieved by random assignment of firms to categories. A f test, analogous to that referred to 
in footnote 10, found the index significantly superior to random assignment at p C 0.001. 
13 There are limitations to evaluating a predictive model in terms of overall classification error 
rate. Such an approach ignores the relative costs of type 1 and type 2 errors. Furthermore, 
classification error rates in bankruptcy studies, even when validated on a holdout sample, typically 
understate the rates that would occur if the model were applied to a true population because 
the proportion of failing firms in the sample used to evaluate the model is greater than the 
proportion found in a true population (Wood and Piesse, 1987). The objective here is not to 
develop an optimal model or advance the state of the art in failure prediction models. The 
index created here is just a medium for testing the potential predictive content of AEF based 
measures. 
14 While the AEF index is quite successful in predicting failure in the year prior to bankruptcy, 
it is less successful in earlier years. This is not surprising. The index includes several variables 
measuring within year trends and year-to-year changes in AEF measures. Group differences 
for these changes were less pronounced in earlier years. For the studies reviewed by Zavgren 
overall validated error rates in year 2 (year 3) ranged from 6%-21% (12%-30%). Indexes 
using AEF measures achieved overall validated error rates in year 2 (year 3) of 23% (25%). 
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